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Beyond the Western Front: The practice of inter-theatre learning in the British army during the First 
World War 
 
 
In his Final Despatch on 28 June 1919, General Sir Edmund Allenby (Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force (EEF)) recalled how the course of the Palestine campaign ‘followed closely the course of 
events’ on the Western Front: 
 
The defence of the Suez Canal, corresponded to the first check of the enemy’s onrush in France and 
Belgium; the period of the advance through the Sinai desert, to the general development of the Allied 
strength and the building up of a secure battle line along the whole front; the 1917 advance, to the 
period of increased Allied pressure which exhausted the enemy’s reserves; whilst the last advance 
coincided with the final Allied counter-offensive.1 
 
For Allenby, although the events in Palestine may not have materially assisted in the defeat of Germany, the 
EEF’s actions did not occur in isolation from the main theatre of operations; instead, they were intimately 
connected. There has been ample scholarship on the Western Front and the political dimension of the subsidiary 
theatres, yet very little has focused on the military connections among the various theatres.2 This is particularly 
true with scholarship on the British army’s ‘learning curve’ or learning process during the First World War. 
 
This idea of a ‘learning curve’ is used to describe the evolution of the army from a small, colonial police force 
to a mass army capable of waging sophisticated operations. Historians associated with the ‘learning curve’ 
concept have used the term to convey the belief that the army learned from its mistakes at the operational and 
tactical levels of war, attaining a high level of proficiency that manifested itself during the Hundred Days 
offensive of 1918. Although this concept is useful in illuminating our understanding of how the army 
transformed, it remains both Anglocentric and Western Front-focused. It is rarely applied to learning that took 
place within the subsidiary theatres, resulting in a well-marked tendency to disregard these theatres from the 
‘learning curve’ narrative. This risks a myopic focus on the Western Front, leading to an incomplete 
understanding of the army and, arguably, its military operations in the early twentieth century. Moreover, the 
concept’s inherent bias of focusing on the end result – combat and operational effectiveness - rather than the 
process for learning obfuscates our understanding of intra-army learning itself. This bias has dominated 
academic scholarship for the last thirty years with a focus on tactics, weapons technologies, command, and 
                                                        
1 C. Falls, Official History of the War: Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine 1917, Part II (2 vols., London, 
1930) II, pp.632-3. 
2  These subsidiary theatres included East Africa (1914-1918), Gallipoli (1915-1916), Italy (1915-1918), 
Mesopotamia (1914-1918), Salonika (1914-1918), and Sinai and Palestine (1915-1918). For consideration of the 
political dimensions of these theatres, see D. Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain, France, and the 
Balkans in the First World War (London, 1997); K. Neilson, ‘“For Diplomatic, Economic, Strategic, and 
Telegraphic Reasons”: British Imperial Defence, the Middle East and India, 1914-1918’, in G. Kennedy and K. 
Neilson, eds., Far Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman 
(London, 1997), pp.103-23; D. French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918 (Oxford, 1995). 
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battle studies, almost all of which are exclusively concerned with the Western Front. 3 Although both Dan 
Todman and Jonathan Boff have cautioned against a linear view of learning in the war,4 their respective research 
revealing a far more complicated process, it is only in recent years that historians, such as Robert Foley and Jim 
Beach, have started to look beneath the ‘learning curve’ to consider the army’s methods for learning.5 This is a 
welcome development, but there is still much work to be done on how the army, as an institution, learned from 
its experiences. If we fail to understand how the army learned, including the techniques it used, then we cannot 
truly understand how the army changed during the war. 
 
Modern organisational theorists have been particularly interested in this relationship between learning and 
change, predicated by the relationship between individual and organisational learning. 6  This debate has 
produced a dichotomy with learning viewed as either an individual function or a collective function. In the case 
of the former, learning is the sum of what individuals learn, giving rise to the belief that organisations can learn 
‘independent of any specific individual, but not independent of all individuals’.7 Conversely, in the case of the 
latter, learning is a reflection of an organisation’s collective rules, procedures, and beliefs, rather than the sum of 
each member’s learning.8 Despite these differences in opinion, a consensus exists among scholars that learning 
occurs through and amongst people and that knowledge acquired by individual learning needs to be transferred 
to others for the organisation to benefit. The tension between these two types of learning fuels debate as to 
whether organisations are capable of learning. These notions are fundamental to the growing literature on 
military innovation and adaptation.9 The field of military innovation studies can be seen as a direct subset of 
organisational learning. As Robert Foley notes, while management theorists developed ideas about ‘learning 
organisations’ and ‘knowledge management’, military historians wrote about ‘innovation’ and, more recently, 
                                                        
3 For tactics, see B. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 
(Toronto, 1992); P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-1918 
(London, 1994). For weapons technologies, see S. Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front in the First 
World War (Aldershot, 2013). For command, see R. Prior and T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The 
Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914-1918 (Barnsley, 1992); A. Simpson, Directing Operations: 
British Corps Command on the Western Front (Stroud, 2006); G. Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the 
British Army (London, 2011). For battle studies, see G. Sheffield, The Somme (London, 2006); R. Lee, The 
Battle of Fromelles 1916 (Newport NSW, 2010). 
4 D. Todman, ‘The Grand Lamasery Revisited: General Headquarters on the Western Front, 1914-1918’, in D. 
Todman and G. Sheffield, eds., Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 
1914-18 (Stroud, 2004), pp.64-5; J. Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army 
and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge, 2012), pp.248-49. 
5 R. Foley, ‘Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes? Learning in the British and German armies during the Great 
War’, International Affairs, XC (2014), pp.279-98; J. Beach, ‘Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at 
British GHQ, 1917-1918’, War in History, XIX (2012), pp.464-49. 
6  See Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge MA, 1968); Peter Senge, The Fifth 
Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organisation (New York, 1990); E. Schein, Organizational 
Culture and Leadership (San Francisco, 1997). 
7 D. H. Kim, ‘The Link between Organizational and Individual Learning’, Sloane Management Review, Fall 
(1993), p.37. 
8 C. M. Fiol and M. A. Lyles, ‘Organizational Learning’, Academic Management Review, X (1985), p.804; B. 
Levitt and J. G. March, ‘Organizational Learning’, Annual Review of Sociology, XIV (1988), p.320. 
9  For literature review of military innovation studies, see A. Grissom, ‘The future of military innovation 
studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies, XXIX (2006), pp.905-34. For military adaptation, see T. Farrell, 
‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006-2009’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, XXXIII (2010), pp.567-94; S. Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in 
Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
XXXV (2012), pp.513-39. 
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‘adaptation’.10 However, scholars have only recently begun to merge these two fields. 11  Foley and Sergio 
Catignani represent the latest attempt to merge the two fields with their respective examinations of the learning 
culture of the British army during the First World War and in the present day.12 Both highlight the army’s 
reliance on informal learning methods owing to an organisational culture that centres on pragmatism and a 
dislike of formal doctrine. Although they acknowledge the army’s utilisation of formal learning systems, both 
argue that learning and knowledge sharing takes place through predominantly informal, individualised methods.  
 
Building on Foley and Catignani’s recent work, this article will consider the army’s process for learning during 
the First World War through an examination of knowledge sharing among its operational theatres. This 
examination is useful for three reasons. First, it moves beyond the standard Western Front narrative of First 
World War historiography, taking a more holistic view of the army and a global perspective of the war. In this 
respect, it responds to calls from Hew Strachan and William Philpott, whilst also complementing recent inter-
theatre research by Mark Harrison and Brian Hall.13 Learning was not a phenomenon limited to the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France and Flanders; rather, it was an institutional and individual process that 
occurred both on and beyond the Western Front. Secondly, and more broadly, it responds to an identified gap 
within military innovation studies by focusing on inter-theatre learning. As Theo Farrell has argued, to 
understand the ‘specific modalities’ of British military learning, it is important to understand learning that 
occurs at an institutional level, across theatres, and from other militaries.14 Rather than focusing on the outcome 
of learning, this article investigates the process and methods by which the army disseminated knowledge across 
its operational theatres. Finally, it gives equal weighting to the army’s formal and informal methods for 
learning. Studies touching on the army’s learning process in the First World War tend to concern themselves 
with formal learning methods, owing to the proliferation of institutionally sanctioned documents, such as after-
action reports, lessons learned documentation, and doctrinal pamphlets. The army was required to develop a 
number of formal learning methods during the war. These particular methods, such as military publications, 
allowed for the dissemination of explicit knowledge across the army’s various expeditionary forces. In 
organisational learning terms, publications are a ‘people-to-documents’ method. They represent the formal 
process by which information is extracted from an individual or unit, made independent, and reused for various 
purposes. This particular approach, known as ‘codification’, gives individuals access to organised knowledge 
                                                        
10 R. Foley, ‘Dumb donkeys’, p.280. 
11 See R. D. Downie, Learning from Conflict: The U. S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War 
(Westport CT, 1998); J. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (London, 2005); P. O’Toole and S. Talbot, ‘Fighting for Knowledge: Developing Learning Systems in 
the Australian Army’, Armed Forces & Society, XXXVII (2011), pp.42-67; R. T. Foley, H. McCartney and S. 
Griffin, ‘“Transforming in contact”: learning the lessons of modern war’, International Affairs, LXXXVII 
(2011), pp.253-70. 
12 Foley, ‘Dumb donkeys’, pp.279-98; S. Catignani, ‘Coping with knowledge: Organizational Learning in the 
British Army?’, Journal for Strategic Studies, XXXVII (2014), pp.30-64. 
13 H. Strachan, ‘The First World War as a Global War’, First World War Studies, I (2010), pp.3-14; W. Philpott, 
‘Beyond the ‘Learning Curve’: The British Army’s Military Transformation in the First World War’, 
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4AF97CF94AC8B/#.U33lrV4k9g0 (accessed 22 May 2014); 
M. Harrison, The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War (Oxford, 2010); B. N. Hall, 
‘Technological Adaptation in a Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications beyond the Western 
Front, 1914-1918’, Journal of Military History, LXXVIII (2014), pp.37-71. 
14 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, pp.591-2. 
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without having to go direct to the originator.15 However, the army did not solely pursue a codification strategy. 
It was far from ignorant of the importance of ‘people-to-people’ methods. These particular methods promote 
knowledge sharing between individuals through mentoring, secondments, or by facilitating social networks. The 
army utilised a number of these methods throughout the war, partly in response to its existing learning culture, 
but also due to the increasingly civilian make up of its organisation. Owing to the proximity of the enemy and 
the inability to disengage fully from the battlefield, experiential or ‘on the job’ learning was just as necessary as 
more explicit methods.  The tendency to separate these methods, rather than viewing them as part of a complex 
whole, manifests in a disintegrative view of the military organisation itself. For organisational learning to take 
place, there needs to be an effective relationship between formal and informal methods. 
 
This article addresses two questions: first, how effective were the British army’s knowledge sharing methods 
between operational theatres; and second, how significant were informal and formal methods to the army’s 
learning process? To answer these questions, this article first provides an overview of the army’s approaches to 
learning before discussing three of the army’s learning methods: military publications, training schools, and 
individuals. This article suggests that, in response to its rapid expansion and increased global commitments, the 
army adopted increasingly bureaucratic methods alongside its traditional, ad hoc approach when sharing 
knowledge across tactical and geographic boundaries.  
 
 
I. Publications 
The British army entered the First World War as an institution that prided itself on adaptation and devolved 
decision-making.16 Required to mount expeditions in different parts of the world, the army’s ethos was one of 
flexibility. The sheer diversity of conditions that forces could realistically face meant that tactics relevant for 
one campaign could be markedly different for the next. As General Sir Neville Lyttelton, the first Chief of the 
General Staff, remarked: 
 
Few people have seen two battles in succession in such startling contrast as Omdurman and Colenso. In 
the first, 50,000 fanatics streamed across the open regardless of cover to certain death, while at Colenso 
I never saw a Boer all day until the battle was over, and it was our men who were the victims.17 
 
This ethos of flexibility encouraged a highly individualised, rather than a ‘one size fits all’, approach to learning. 
The nascent General Staff could do little to challenge the primacy of the regiment or curb the influence of 
individual generals, often resulting in a proliferation of different tactical methods.18 
                                                        
15 M. T. Hansen, N. Nohria and T. Tierney, ‘What’s Your Strategy for Managing Knowledge?’, Harvard 
Business Review, Mar-Apr 1999, p.2. 
16 D. French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People, c. 1870-2000 
(Oxford, 2005); S. Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914 
(Norman OK, 2012). 
17 N. Lyttelton, Eighty Years: Soldiering, Politics, Games (London, 1927), p.212. 
18 H. Strachan, ‘The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment, 1904-1914’, in D. French 
and B. Holden Reid, eds., The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, c. 1890-1939 (London, 2002), 
p.90; M. A. Ramsey, Command and Cohesion: The Citizen Soldiers and Minor Tactics in the British Army, 
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The experience of the South African War in particular had shocked the army resulting in a long period of 
organisational reform and introspective lesson learning. 19  This led to a change in its tactics, weaponry, 
command structure, and training, but the learning process itself was far from straightforward.20 Individual units 
still often retained the knowledge they derived from operational experience as a form of oral tradition, resulting 
in lessons and experience failing to influence the army as a whole.21 Although the pre-war army had formal 
learning methods, such as the military academies and service journals, they were not designed to reach 
everybody at once. The small size of the army and the relative homogeneity of the officer corps made a 
personalised approach to learning feasible if not wholly desirable. However, the army’s rapid expansion during 
the First World War and its deployment to diverse operational theatres challenged this personalised approach. 
The army had to develop a series of organised, formal learning methods to ensure that its forces were aware of 
the latest developments taking place around the globe and not just on the Western Front. It became apparent that 
the army could no longer rely on a personalised approach to learning. The growing scale, size, and intensity of 
the war compelled it to adopt a bureaucratic approach in its dissemination of knowledge. 
 
One of these bureaucratic methods for knowledge sharing within the army was through publications. Although 
the army’s methods for learning have been neglected in the historiography, the writing and production of the 
Stationery Service (SS) series of publications is an exception to this rule and has been a subject of interest for 
scholars.22 The first SS pamphlet, SS23 Preliminary Deductions, for Instruction, from Recent Engagements was 
issued in November 1915. Prior to this, publications were printed by the War Office’s Central Distribution 
Section (CDS). The earliest known CDS pamphlet, CDS2 Notes from the Front, was published in December 
1914. These publications represented the British army’s standard operating procedure. They were an explicit 
form of knowledge in that they were portable and could be readily transmitted to different parts of the military 
organisation. For the high command, these publications were ‘merely amplifications’ of the army’s pre-war 
manuals, produced to ‘meet the varying requirements’ of the war.23 These ‘amplifications’ covered a myriad of 
topics, ranging from the training and employment of bombers to lessons drawn from specific operations. The 
use and subsequent adaptation of the SS series went beyond the Western Front and was widespread throughout 
the army’s operational theatres. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1870-1918 (Westport CT, 2002), p.92. For debates around influence of General Staff and primacy of regiment, 
see M. Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in British and German Armies 1888-
1918 (London, 1995); T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence 
of Modern Warfare 1900-1918 (Barnsley, 2004); Jones, From Boer War, pp.54-55. 
19 See T. Bowman and M. Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British 
Army, 1902-1914 (Oxford, 2012); H. Strachan, ‘The Boer War and its Impact on the British Army, 1902-1914’, 
in P. B. Boyden, A. J. Guy and M. Harding, eds., Ashes and Blood: The British Army in South Africa 1795-1914 
(London, 1999), pp.85-98; J. Gooch, ‘Britain and the Boer War’, in G. J. Andreopolous and H. E. Selesky, eds., 
The Aftermath of Defeat: Societies, Armed Forces, and the Challenge of Recovery (New Haven CT, 1994), 
pp.40-58.  
20 Gooch, ‘The Boer War’, p.57; Jones, From Boer War, p.213. 
21 T. R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947 (Basingstoke, 
1998), p.36. 
22 See Beach, ‘General Staff’, pp.464-491. 
23 Australian War Memorial (AWM), AWM25 947/76, Infantry Training France 1917, O.B./165, 8 May 1917. 
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Although there was provision for a printing depot in the field as part of the BEF’s mobilisation plans, the War 
Office’s CDS held responsibility for the initial production of military publications. Once printed, these CDS 
publications were despatched to France for distribution via the Army Printing and Stationery Service (APSS). In 
addition to Western Front demands for general stationery and specific publications, both the CDS and APSS 
also received ad hoc requests from the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the various expeditionary forces who 
desired the latest literature from France and Flanders.24 One of General Sir William Birdwood’s first actions as 
commander of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, for example, was to ask for ‘copies of any 
instructional pamphlets you may have on points of training… on experience gained up to date in the war’.25 This 
was followed up with a subsequent demand for ‘Notes from the Front vols one and two 1500 copies of each’ 
and ‘three hundred copies each of Lecture by [Brigadier-General Robert] Montgomery, Notes on Artillery in the 
Present War, and Notes on the Use of Plane Tables with Artillery’.26 The turnaround time for these demands 
was surprisingly quick. Birdwood received his publications after less than a week,27 while Brigadier-General 
Webb Gillman (BGGS British Salonika Force (BSF)) referenced publications such as Memorandum relating to 
the experience gained from the Verdun actions in a BSF training memorandum in early July 1916 – less than 
two months after its publication in France.28 
 
This continual stream of individual demands placed strain on a system that had been established for a small field 
force. Although the APSS had printing depots in Salonika and Egypt by mid-1916, the initial distribution of 
Western Front SS pamphlets was still conducted on an ad hoc basis.29 Unsurprisingly, this practice soon became 
unworkable. However, the army continued to operate in an ad hoc manner until early 1917 when the distribution 
process was finally overhauled. Following a request for recent SS pamphlets from the Mesopotamia and 
Salonika theatres in February 1917, GHQ BEF instructed the APSS to issue three copies of all publications 
forthwith to ‘G.O.Cs Egypt, Salonica, Mesopotamia [and] C.in.C. India’. 30  Any further copies of these 
pamphlets were to be produced locally in-theatre. The army’s decision to standardise distribution marked the 
transition from ‘pulled’ transfer – where theatres requested publications that would be of use to them – to 
‘pushed’ transfer – where all publications were sent out to the various theatres, irrespective of need or relevance. 
This decision ran counter to the army’s pre-war ethos, which had centred on a highly individualised and 
decentralised approach to learning. The pushed transfer of publications aimed to reach as many individuals as 
possible. However, this decision did not represent a complete departure from its pre-war ethos. It still remained 
up to each expeditionary force’s GHQ to judge whether or not to circulate the material. This suggests that there 
was considerable organisational flexibility that allowed for independent learning in the subsidiary theatres. 
 
                                                        
24 The National Archives (TNA), WO 95/81, Director of Printing and Stationery Service War Diary, 24 May 
1916; TNA WO 95/4362, Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) GHQ War diary, 26 April 1916. 
25 AWM, 3DRL/3376 11/12, Papers of Lord Birdwood, Telegram, Delhi to War Office, 2 December 1914. 
26 AWM, 3DRL/3376 11/12, Papers of Lord Birdwood, Telegram, Delhi to War Office, 24 December 1914. 
Brigadier-General Montgomery was BGGS to IV Corps. 
27 AWM, 3DRL/3376 11/12, Papers of Lord Birdwood, Telegram, War Office to Birdwood, 6 December 1914. 
28 TNA, WO 95/4756, BSF GHQ War Diary, Memo to GOCs XII and XVI Corps, 6 July 1916. 
29 TNA, WO 95/81, Director of Printing and Stationery Service War Diary, 19 June 1916. 
30 TNA, WO 95/81, Director of Printing and Stationery Service War Diary, 14 February 1917. Instructions for 
the formal dissemination of SS pamphlets to the Italian Expeditionary Force (IEF) were agreed on 13 January 
1918. 
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As the various operational theatres grew in size, Base Supply Depots were established to satisfy printing needs 
in-theatre. This permitted them to produce their own publications based on local experience. Examples of this 
include the Italian Expeditionary Force’s (IEF) SS652 I.E.F. Traffic Orders and a subsequent publication on hill 
training, along with the EEF’s Notes on the Employment of Lewis Guns in the Desert.31 Despite the production 
of these theatre-specific publications, there was still considerable appetite for Western Front literature. 32 
However, the question of relevance was never far from the minds of the high command. Major-General Guy 
Dawnay, a senior staff officer in both Palestine and on the Western Front, noted the ‘well marked tendency to 
apply the lessons of experience indiscriminately’, 33  while Major-General Arthur McNamara criticised 
commanders at Gallipoli for trying to ‘apply the methods applicable to the war in France, to which they had 
little relation’.34 Although the army favoured principles over prescription, this attitude echoed the pre-war 
reluctance of applying the tactics and lessons from one campaign to another.35 
 
A number of Western Front publications were broad enough to cater for most theatres, such as SS135 Training 
and Employment of Divisions and SS143 Instructions of the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, and 
provided the foundation for infantry training in the subsidiary theatres. The BSF Infantry School listed both 
SS135 and SS143 as required reading for officers undertaking the course, 36  while corps and divisional 
commanders’ conferences in the IEF drew attention to these same publications for the purposes of patrolling and 
hill warfare in April 1918.37 However, the majority of pamphlets were concerned with battle conditions on the 
Western Front. This required commanders and staffs of the various expeditionary forces to modify these 
pamphlets for use in-theatre. For example, two pages of notes by Major-General Sydenham Smith (Major 
General Royal Artillery (MGRA) EEF) accompanied the distribution of SS139 Notes on Artillery, offering 
guidance on the use and applicability of this particular publication in Palestine. In his consideration, Smith 
noted that ‘the whole tenour [sic] of this book applies to conditions of trench warfare such as appertain in 
France… we must therefore be careful to adapt the principles to the nature of such defences as confront us from 
time to time’.38 The adaptation of these publications was not just limited to the higher levels of command. With 
tactical publications such as SS143, divisions had latitude to interpret and adapt them to their local situation.39 
Whereas some divisional commanders in the subsidiary theatres, such as John Shea (GOC 60th (2/2nd) London 
                                                        
31 TNA, WO 95/4203, IEF Director of Supply and Transport War Diary, 21 March 1918; TNA, WO 95/4229, 
23rd Division General Staff (GS) War Diary, Notes from Corps Commander’s conference, 24 March 1918; 
TNA, WO 95/4366, EEF GHQ War Diary, Lynden-Bell to War Office, 9 November 1916. 
32 See C. S. Forrest, ‘The 52nd (Lowland) Division in the Great War’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Salford, 2010, pp.168-70. 
33  Imperial War Museum (IWM), 69/21/1, Papers of Major-General Sir G. P. Dawnay, Draft Lecture on 
Dardanelles and Palestine, n.d. 
34 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), 4/4, Papers of General Sir W. M. StG. Kirke, Notes by 
Major General A. E. McNamara on training in peace time and in war, May 1932. 
35 Moreman, The Army in India, pp.38-41; French, Military Identities, p.65. 
36 TNA, WO 95/4946, BSF Infantry Training School War Diary, Training syllabus, 3 February 1918. 
37 TNA, WO 95/4229, 23rd Division GS War Diary, Notes from Corps Commander’s conference, 24 March 
1918; TNA, WO 95/4229, 23rd Division GS War Diary, Proceedings of a conference held at divisional 
headquarters, 28 April 1918. 
38 TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, Notes by MGRA on the two pamphlets SS139/3 and SS139/4, 4 
May 1917. 
39 This was in contrast to the Western Front where GHQ BEF was determined that SS143’s platoon structure 
should be ‘adopted throughout all Armies in France’. See GHQ, SS144 The Normal Formation for the Attack, 
1917. 
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Division) thought that the new platoon structure was ‘absolutely correct’, 40 the 74th (Yeomanry) Division 
modified SS143 to meet its own needs and experiences. In August 1917, battalions of that division reorganised 
as per SS143. However, instead of including a section of rifle grenadiers, a sniper section took its place.41 The 
type of warfare that confronted the division meant that the enemy was rarely within assaulting distance, thus 
rendering the rifle grenade – a trench warfare munition – somewhat superfluous. In contrast, a sniper section 
offered a useful way of engaging the enemy at long range. 
 
The decision to reorganise based on Western Front principles suggests that expeditionary forces, such as the 
EEF, did not exist in isolation from the wider tactical or indeed administrative developments taking place in 
other theatres.42 Although adaptation was encouraged, a clear attempt to promote uniformity endured across the 
army’s expeditionary forces. The BSF, for example, ordered its formations to reorganise based on SS143 to 
‘assimilate the organisation of battalions in this Force with that of battalions in the British armies in France and 
to ensure the necessary degree of uniformity of training in battalions’.43 This serves to highlight the conflict 
between ensuring a systematic approach while simultaneously encouraging devolved decision-making. 
Expeditionary forces were not compelled to adopt Western Front practice, yet, due to manpower demands, it 
was ill-advised to prepare for just one type of warfare. The possibility of transferring to another theatre of 
operations at relatively short notice meant that formations usually had to prepare for two types of warfare: 
offensive operations in their current theatre and warfare as conducted on the Western Front.44 In the case of 
52nd (Lowland) Division, for example, its training in Western Front methods enabled it to make an effective 
contribution to the military operations of the BEF.45 
 
 
II. Training schools 
Although they were a learning method in their own right, military publications also provided the basis for the 
army’s training school system. Indeed, the dissemination of a publication was not always enough. Recalling 
preparations for the second battle of Gaza, one soldier in the 5th Highland Light Infantry recalled that 
‘pamphlets on the attack, written for trench warfare in France, were liberally issued. One’s brain became terribly 
confused’. 46  Although the ‘pushed’ distribution method was working, this soldier’s account suggests that 
pamphlets were not always read or understood. No soldier was ever expected to read every training pamphlet 
                                                        
40 TNA, WO 95/4660, 60th Division GS War Diary, Memorandum on Lessons Learned, 13 November 1917. 
41 C. H. Dudley Ward, The 74th (Yeomanry) Division in Syria and France (London, 1922), p.67. 
42 The decision to despatch an expeditionary force to Italy required the hurried establishment of a new British 
transportation directorate prior to the arrival of British forces. Owing to the intimate link between the Western 
and Italian fronts, it was necessary that the directorate ‘followed the lines of organisation for the BEF’. The 
majority of the manpower required for the directorate was drawn from ‘officers and men that could be spared’ 
from the BEF’s Transportation Directorate. See Institution of Royal Engineers, History of the Corps of Royal 
Engineers (8 vols., Chatham, 2008) V, pp.691-2. 
43 TNA, WO 95/4757, BSF GHQ War Diary, Memo to GOCs XII and XVI Corps, 5 June 1917. 
44 The 27th Division, for example, had little more than two weeks between notification and embarkation for 
Salonika. It received information on 31 October 1915 that it was to entrain for Salonika and began its 
subsequent embarkation on 17 November 1915. TNA, WO 95/2255/2, 27th Division A&Q War Diary, 31 
October 1915. 
45 Forrest, ‘52nd (Lowland) Division’, p.357. 
46 F. L. Morrison, The Fifth Battalion, Highland Light Infantry in the War, 1914-18 (Glasgow, 1921), p.147. 
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issued. Indeed, the pamphlets read would have depended on that soldier’s rank or role. However, in some cases, 
these pamphlets still required interpretation and to be put into practice. Training – both in schools and in units - 
provided that method of interpretation. 
 
Prior to the creation of the BEF’s Training Directorate in January 1917, the establishment of training schools 
relied on the initiative of individual commanders.47 By the winter of 1916-17, a number of schools at army, 
corps and division existed, but had little uniformity as to how they ran or the methods taught. 48  The 
establishment of the Training Directorate offered a way of enforcing ‘uniformity of doctrine’, as well as 
standardising the teaching of that doctrine. The publication of SS152 Instructions for the Training of the British 
Armies in France encapsulated this drive for uniformity. Published as a provisional document in June 1917,49 
SS152 set out the army’s ‘general policy of training’ and the system it would use to ensure ‘uniformity of 
doctrine’. Its publication led to a complete overhaul and standardisation of the schools system within the BEF. 
As Alastair Geddes has argued, the reduction of the number of schools limited the opportunity for different 
training creeds.50 This made the system more manageable. To compliment the standardised school system, 
SS152 was highly prescriptive regarding the syllabus for each school, including the number of students in each 
cohort and the types of publications to be used.51 
 
Devised for use in the BEF, SS152’s dissemination to the other expeditionary forces meant that it also provided 
the basis for schools in the subsidiary theatres. Its use was notable in the BSF with the establishment of GHQ 
schools for infantry, artillery, signal, gas, and Lewis and Vickers guns.52 Surviving records for the BSF’s Lewis 
and Vickers Gun school outline the development of a new programme of training, prepared ‘on the lines laid 
down in “Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France” with reference to the latest literature 
from France and Grantham’.53 However, as with military publications, the training syllabus needed to be made 
relevant to local conditions. The BSF Lewis and Vickers Gun school, therefore, eliminated certain aspects of the 
syllabus prescribed by SS152, such as revolver drill and ‘warfare of highly organised defences’.54 This flexible 
approach was also evident in the BSF Infantry school. The core pamphlets mirrored those used in France, 
including SS135, SS143, and SS185 Assault Training, yet responsibility was placed on the Commandant and his 
instructors to ensure that the course was relevant to conditions in Salonika. 55  This tendency towards 
decentralisation suggests that the centre of the organisation was positively delegating responsibility to the 
                                                        
47 For discussion on establishment of training directorate and role of GHQ, see A. Geddes, ‘Solly-Flood, GHQ, 
and Tactical Training in the BEF, 1916-1918’, MA dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2007; D. Molineux, 
‘The Effect of Platoon Structure on Tactical Development in the BEF: June to November 1918’, MA 
dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2009. 
48 TNA, WO 256/15, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig Diaries, Summary of Schools of Training for the British 
Expeditionary Force during Winter 1916-17, n.d. 
49 A revised version of SS152 was published in January 1918. 
50 Geddes, ‘Solly-Flood’, p.20. 
51 Op. cit., p.21. 
52 C. Falls, Official History of the War: Military Operations, Macedonia (2 vols., London, 1933) II, p.57. 
53 TNA, WO 95/4946, BSF Lewis and Vickers Gun School War Diary, 24 June 1918. Grantham was home to 
the Machine Gun Training Centre and the Machine Gun School. 
54 TNA, WO 95/4946, BSF Lewis and Vickers Gun School War Diary, 24 June 1918. 
55 TNA, WO 95/4946, BSF Infantry School War Diary, Appendix 7, 3 February 1918. 
10 
 
periphery. This policy of adaptation and decentralisation is also evident within the EEF. In a letter to the force’s 
corps commanders, Guy Dawnay wrote that: 
 
The various pamphlets, published on training, cannot be accepted as containing the final word so far as 
the preparations for operations in this country are concerned. It is considered that the experience gained 
on the subject, which may have called for modifications and variations in the pamphlets referred to, are 
worth… collating and placing on record for future guidance.56  
 
Although syllabi were adapted to suit local training needs, training in Western Front warfare was not neglected. 
Within the EEF, for example, a specialist branch of the Imperial School of Instruction was established for the 
sole purpose of training in trench warfare. Governed by SS143, the syllabus included the ‘combined training and 
tactical handling of Stokes Guns, Lewis Guns and bombers’.57 The EEF also established a sniper school to be 
‘conducted on the lines of an Army Sniper School in France’. This was, in large part, due to the success of the 
BEF’s First Army School of Sniping under Major Hesketh Hesketh-Prichard.58 To ensure that training remained 
up to date, the schools sought instructors with relevant experience and the ability to ensure that both military 
publications and the wider training syllabi were understandable to the student. Schools in the subsidiary theatres 
wanted instructors with ‘recent experience in France’, as well as those familiar with the latest literature from 
schools in the UK.59 In the BSF, for example, a Regular RSM was brought over from France as ‘Sergeant of 
Training’ at the Infantry school,60 while two instructors and three sergeant instructors were despatched from the 
Machine Gun Training Centre at Grantham to run the Lewis and Vickers Gun school.61 The EEF was just as 
keen as its Salonika counterpart, requesting two regular officers from France to run the Senior Officers’ school 
at Heliopolis.62 Brigadier-General Walter Salmond (GOC Middle East Brigade, Royal Flying Corps) called for 
the attachment of a GSO 1 to help him ‘keep in touch with progress at home and in France’, but also to help 
‘coordinate methods of training out here with those at home’. For Salmond, the lack of expertise meant it was 
‘not possible to keep abreast of improvements in France… and this affects operations’.63 The need for these 
experienced staff officers was clear in the EEF’s appointment of three regular officers with experience of staff 
duties and instruction to run its Staff School at Mena House.64 Of these three officers, two of them had been 
instructors at the junior staff school at Clare College, Cambridge, prior to their appointment to Mena House. 
The EEF Staff School, established in January 1917, was run on similar lines to the staff school in France with an 
intake of thirty students;65 fifteen of these students were nominated by the BSF. As part of their participation on 
                                                        
56 TNA, WO 95/4368, EEF GHQ War Diary, Memo to GOCs XX, XXI and DMC, 16 October 1917. 
57 TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, 12 June 1917. E. Erickson, Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World 
War 1: A Comparative Study (London, 2007), pp.129-30. 
58 TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, Lynden-Bell to GOC Eastern Force, 5 July 1917; H. V. Hesketh-
Prichard, Sniping in France 1914-18 (Solihull, 2000). 
59 TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, 8 May 1917. 
60 TNA, WO 95/4946, BSF Infantry School War Diary, 10 January 1918. 
61 TNA, WO 95/4946, BSF Lewis and Vickers Gun School War Diary, 26 June 1918. 
62 TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, 8 May 1917. 
63 TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, Salmond to War Office, 8 March 1917. 
64 IWM, 90/1/1, Papers of Major-General Sir A. L. Lynden-Bell, Lynden-Bell to Maurice, 10 January 1917. 
65 TNA, WO 161/42, Letters of Brig-Gen E M Paul to Director of Fortifications and Works (War Office), Letter 
19, 10 April 1917. 
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the course, the BSF candidates were taken ‘to see something of the work on the eastern front’.66 This gave them 
an appreciation of the situation facing the EEF and a grounding in the administrative requirements of fighting in 
the desert. A fortunate by-product of this mixed cohort was that it also allowed for students from different 
theatres to learn from each other. 
 
The use of Western Front publications and instructors ensured that training schools and courses of instruction 
served as key fora for the practical dissemination of Western Front knowledge. This knowledge spread 
throughout the expeditionary forces through the army’s use of cascade training or ‘teach the teacher’ systems.67 
Cascade training focuses on the training of a small group who then pass on what they know to others further 
down the organisation hierarchy. It allows for the dissemination of information through the ranks in a relatively 
short period of time.68 Officers and men who attended formal schools were expected to cascade the information 
to their respective units either as an instructor or through less formal means such as lecturing. John Monash, for 
example, wrote that to keep up the supply of trained instructors in 3rd Australian Division, ‘selected officers and 
NCOs do courses of from one to three weeks… and are then returned to their units to continue the training of 
the junior personnel’;69 while Brigadier-General Herbert Gordon (GOC 70th Brigade) decided to deliver a 
lecture to his men on his ‘recent course with the French at Verona’.70 Gordon’s approach was recommended by 
SS152, which advised that ‘lectures should be given on matters of interest by Officers recently returned from 
Schools, by Staff Officers and outside Lecturers when procurable’.71 This suggests a greater emphasis on the 
individual as a way of sharing knowledge. Where possible, instructors from training schools would also visit 
formations to deliver lectures on the latest methods.72  
 
Like training schools, lectures provided a good way of sharing knowledge as well as distilling the information 
found within military publications. The army recognised that ‘subordinate commanders have not always the 
time or the inclination to study official books. This can to a large extent be remedied by lectures given by 
officers of all ranks’.73 Often informal in nature, these lectures made the explicit information found within 
publications accessible to a larger group. Colonel Rory Macleod, an artillery officer serving in the IEF, practised 
this approach, making ‘all the officers in this battery give lectures in the evenings. Each Officer has one subject, 
and he lectures on it once a week’.74 This practice was important to the battery, as ‘officers are quite keen on 
                                                        
66 IWM, 90/1/1, Papers of Major-General Sir A. L. Lynden-Bell, Lynden-Bell to Maurice, 10 January 1917. 
67 This was practiced extensively in the German army. See Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys’, p.290. 
68  J. Cheese, ‘Cascading the Training’, Innovations in Education & Training International, XXIII (1986), 
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Advances in Developing Human Resources, III (2001), pp.496-503. 
69 AWM, 3DRL/2316 1/1, Papers of General Sir J. Monash, Monash to wife, 11 January 1917. 
70 TNA, WO 95/4239, 70 Brigade War Diary, 4 March 1918. 
71 GHQ, SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, 1917, pp.8-9. 
72 As well as lecturing to formations, instructors were often attached to front line units for short periods to 
ensure that their instruction was kept up to date. See G. H. Addison, The Work of the Royal Engineers in the 
European War, 1914-19: Schools (Uckfield, 2006), p.359; TNA, WO 95/4756, BSF GHQ War Diary, MGGS 
BSF to IGC BSF, 20 December 1916; TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, Lynden-Bell to GOC Eastern 
Force, 17 May 1917. 
73  TNA, WO 95/4229, 23rd Division GS War Diary, Proceedings of a Conference held at Divisional 
Headquarters, 26 April 1918. 
74 National Army Museum (NAM), 8112-9, Papers of Colonel R. Macleod, ‘An Artillery Officer in the First 
World War’, n.d, p.192. 
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listening to what one of their number is saying’.75 In the EEF, Captain Noel Drury recounted a ‘very informal 
lecture by Gen F[rederick] A[ugustus] Greer, all of us sitting round in shirt sleeves, and smoking’. 76 The 
informality often found in these lectures was a welcome departure from the prescriptive syllabi of the training 
schools. As Macleod recalled, although he enjoyed the Senior Officers’ course at GHQ IEF, he found that some 
of the syllabus was ‘quite old’ and covered principles he had already learned during initial training at 
Woolwich.77 
 
 
III. People 
As seen with the use of lectures, the individual could play an important role in the sharing of knowledge. As 
Foley argues, informal, people-centred methods formed a central part of the army’s learning process.78 This 
aligned with the army’s organisational culture, its amateur tradition, and the continuing importance of 
personalities and patronage. However, this approach to learning is not limited to the British army. Research into 
corporate workplace learning reveals that nearly two-thirds of work-related information comes from face-to-face 
meetings, mentoring, and apprenticeships.79 The army recognised the importance of these ‘on the job’ methods 
through its promotion of secondment and attachment schemes.80 
 
For the army, secondments facilitated the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge between theatres. Inter-
theatre secondments were usually governed by the GHQs of the various expeditionary forces and were often in 
response to identified gaps in the force’s knowledge base. The request for suitable instructors for training 
schools is a good example of this. The same can be said for both staff officers and individuals with specialist 
technical knowledge. As early as March 1916, Brigadier-General Philip Howell (BGGS BSF) drew attention to 
the ‘rapidly decreasing’ proportion of staff officers with Staff College or specialist training. Howell suggested 
arranging ‘permanent or temporary transfers’ to widen the experience of new and existing officers.81 Lieutenant-
General Sir George Milne (CinC, BSF) was vocal in his support for secondments. In early 1918, Milne 
advocated ‘an interchange of officers between Salonica [sic.] and the French and Italian fronts’. Lieutenant-
Colonel Edward Plunkett, a liaison officer to the BSF, wrote how Milne believed that: 
 
80% of the officers at Salonica would volunteer for service in France, while a large number of officers 
now in France would welcome a change to Salonica […] There are many officers at Salonica with from 
                                                        
75 Op. cit., p.192. 
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10 to 20 years experience, and Lt-Gen Milne does not consider that the country is getting full value 
from the time and money spent on their military education.82 
 
Having previously served as both an artillery and divisional commander on the Western Front, Milne realised 
that the nature and tempo of operations in France would invariably result in the most up to date methods. He 
favoured Western Front practice and the wider attachment system, endorsing the attachment of a number of his 
senior artillery officers to formations on the Western Front to ‘study modern artillery methods’ in June 1917.83 
This party included, amongst others, Major-General William Onslow (MGRA BSF), Brigadier-General Hugh 
White-Thomson (BGRA XII Corps), and Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Holbrooke, who later became the first 
counter-battery staff officer (CBSO) at XII Corps in August 1917.84 By sending senior officers to the Western 
Front, Milne increased the likelihood that modern, Western Front artillery methods would disseminate 
throughout his force. Milne’s decision to sanction these attachments may well explain the subsequent decision 
to trial a CBSO in XII Corps to ‘carry out counter battery work as employed in France’. 85 CBSOs were 
established on the Western Front from January 1917 onwards – seven months earlier than in Salonika.86 Sound 
ranging (SR) – a vital component of counter-battery work – was also pioneered and developed on the Western 
Front.87 By November 1918, there were twenty-five SR groups on the Western Front and a handful scattered 
among the Italy, Palestine, and Salonika theatres.88 To benefit from this new technology, the subsidiary theatres 
relied on the despatch of trained officers from France, or, alternatively, they were required to send their own 
officers for attachment and training on the Western Front.89 It was only in January 1918 that SR was added to 
the establishment of the Field Survey Companies in Salonika. This suggests that, even with attachments, there 
could still be a considerable lag when importing Western Front practice and technology to other theatres. 
 
In addition to lectures and secondments, the interpersonal relationships between individuals in the British army 
provided another method for learning. Modern management theory depicts the process of organisational 
learning as an iceberg. The small section above water covers formal learning, while the larger, submerged 
section represents informal learning.90 The prevalence of informal learning can be attributed to the fact that 
individuals are often more likely to turn to each other, rather than documents, for information.91 The use of 
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informal social networks allows individuals to circumvent often unwieldy formal systems, thus reducing the 
problem of knowledge lag.92 Individuals, such as Philip Howell, took advantage of their own social networks to 
secure up-to-date publications prior to the army’s decision to standardise distribution. Howell’s pre-war 
relationship with Sir Douglas Haig resulted in the latter sending him ‘some reports which may interest you, and 
[I] have also got [Lieutenant-General Sir Richard] Butler to make up a package of publications on 
training questions which might be of use to you’.93 
 
Although a shared identity and culture bound together individuals within the army, the importance of informal 
networks to the working of the army cannot be overlooked.94 Knowledge does not simply result from processes 
or activities; it comes from people and communities of people. There needs to be an element of connectedness 
between individuals for social networks to bear fruit. This connectedness could be through shared attendance at 
public school, Sandhurst, the Staff College, or through membership of other social groups such as hunts or 
gentlemen’s clubs. In a letter to Alec Godley, for example, George Milne reminisced on the fortunes of his 
cohort at the Staff College, noting that: 
 
…a good many of us who were at the S[taff] C[ollege] together seem to be fairly busy in the war. You, 
Robertson, Gough, Hunter Bunter, Braithwaite… and many others… We know little of the war in 
France and anxiously pick up all the crumbs we can.95 
 
The tendency to focus on formal, hierarchical methods of learning has meant that the impact of these informal, 
lateral relationships has sometimes been overlooked. As these interactions are social and often ad hoc in nature, 
the process and outcome are very rarely written down. However, evidence of these interactions can be found in 
personal correspondence, particularly between senior officers. Like Milne, Stanley Maude (CinC, Indian 
Expeditionary Force D) was keen to keep in touch with Western Front developments during his time in 
Mesopotamia. Writing to his family, Maude noted that he was ‘getting a good many letters now… from the War 
Office, and from Army, Corps and Divisional Commanders in France and Egypt’. This ensured that he was kept 
‘posted with what is going on there’.96 Throughout the Gallipoli campaign, Henry Rawlinson was in regular 
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communication with senior officers in the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, including Braithwaite, Godley, 
and Ian Hamilton.97 The correspondence between these men reveals discussions around the reasons for success 
or failure in the different theatres. In a letter to Clive Wigram (Private Secretary to King George V), Rawlinson 
wrote that he had: 
 
heard from Braithwaite the other day describing the difficulties of the situation which confronts them – 
Achi Baba is not dissimilar to many of the fortified strongholds which confront us here so I sent him 
some of our experiences on the best way to deal with barbed wire and trenches.98 
 
Rawlinson also sent reports and sketches to Godley, outlining how the divisions and corps on the Western Front 
were arranged to ensure that the troops were kept in ‘good fighting trim’.99 A further example involved an 
exchange between Rawlinson and Philip Chetwode (GOC XX Corps) who were both Old Etonians and 
members of the Turf Club. It provides an illuminating example of the written learning relationship between 
theatres. Prior to the Beersheba operations in October 1917, Chetwode consulted Rawlinson over the difficulties 
of water supply in the Palestine theatre. The reply from Rawlinson was sensible enough: ‘Why don’t you do as 
I’ve done in my Army Area here? I’ve got nearly twenty miles of pipe lines laid down’. Chetwode smiled, 
remarking: ‘I must tell him… we’ve already got one hundred and fifty miles of pipe line’.100 Knowledge was 
shared across boundaries, but logistical lessons were not always applicable given the poor existing transport 
infrastructure and hostile desert terrain of the Middle East. 
 
Far from preventing these informal exchanges of information, the army tolerated and, in some cases, encouraged 
these discussions. The concepts of ‘clubbability’ and the ‘old school tie’ encompassed a variety of pre-existing 
social networks that overlaid the shared identity of service in the army. These concepts still held currency in 
Edwardian society and were exploited by the army with the establishment of officers’ and social clubs in the UK 
and abroad, such as The King George and Queen Mary Clubs and the AIF’s War Chest Club in London.101 The 
value of these clubs was quickly realised by the army who used the clubs’ bulletin boards to post information 
and orders from the front.102 The ‘old school tie’ further manifested through the numerous school, university, 
and regimental dinners that took place on all fronts during the war. These dinners were often advertised in the 
General Routine Orders of each expeditionary force and, while not envisaged as a way of sharing knowledge, 
still served to provide extra lubricant for the mechanics of socialisation. 103 The army also used its formal 
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training schools to promote socialising and discussion. The object of the first Royal Engineers (RE) School of 
Instruction at Le Parcq, for example, was to ‘enable officers from different parts of the line to exchange their 
experiences and methods, to their mutual advantage’.104 The second RE School, which started at Blendecques in 
December 1917, built on the principles espoused at Le Parcq. However, unlike Le Parcq, officers at 
Blendecques ‘came to know each other much better and consequently more discussion took place’.105 This 
forum for discussion was not just reserved for attendees on the course. In connection with the school, several 
conferences of divisional Commanders Royal Engineers (CRE) were held under the presidency of an Army 
Chief Engineer, thus affording ‘an invaluable opportunity for the exchange of ideas’.106 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Shaped by its pre-war attitude to learning, the British army shared knowledge among its operational theatres 
through a number of different media. In response to its rapid expansion and its increasing global commitments, 
the army was forced to develop a series of bureaucratic methods, including publications and training schools, to 
share knowledge between its expeditionary forces. It could no longer rely on a purely ad hoc, highly 
personalised approach to learning. As a result, forces were bombarded with the latest literature and tactics. 
However, owing to its organisational and learning culture, the army was reticent when it came to enforcing this 
literature. The dissemination of Western Front publications to the other theatres often came with a caveat around 
the ‘considerable dissimilarity in conditions and methods’.107 It was, therefore, for each force to discern the 
value of this information for use in-theatre. The various forces were not obliged to adhere to Western Front 
practice, suggesting that the army had not completely departed from its tendency towards decentralised 
decision-making. It was flexible enough to delegate responsibility to the periphery. Indeed, by focusing on the 
learning experience beyond the Western Front, this article has highlighted the depth and expanse of the army’s 
learning process. 
 
As both Foley and Beach have argued, the development of formal methods took time to mature. It took until 
February 1917 for the systematic dissemination of military publications to the subsidiary theatres, while the 
doctrine writing process behind those publications did not really mature until mid-1918.108 The army recognised 
that it needed to invest in a series of methods to enhance its organisational learning experience. However, it 
could not favour formal over informal methods. In keeping with its highly personalised approach, the army 
actively encouraged a variety of ‘people-to-people’ methods for sharing knowledge, including secondments, 
whilst tolerating underlying informal social networks. These avenues were heavily influenced by the social and 
cultural affiliations that transcended the shared culture of the army. The army exploited these affiliations, 
working in conjunction with existing Edwardian social structures and using them as a means of increasing its 
learning potential. It clearly understood the benefits of networking and conversation as a way of sharing 
knowledge both in-theatre and between theatres. These informal methods were a legacy of the army’s 
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preference for pragmatic solutions. This suggests that, unwittingly or not, the army pursued a strategy of 
personalisation, supported by one of codification.109  
 
Although the various expeditionary forces had their own tactical and geographical peculiarities, coupled with 
the inevitable differences in scale and tempo, the lessons and innovations from the Western Front were highly 
sought after. Training schools based their syllabi on Western Front publications and preferred instructors with 
‘experience gained in France’. The army’s learning methods were effective in sharing knowledge among the 
theatres, as well as ensuring the successful establishment of a Western Front bedrock. This bedrock was 
propagated by senior officers and commanders in the British army who were willing to engage with the mass of 
literature produced in order to identify, assess, and, where required, adapt the learning process of the Western 
Front to suit conditions faced in their own theatres. Ultimately, success in the First World War was predicated 
upon the swift, efficient transfer of knowledge. The army had to develop and engage with both formal and 
informal methods to realise this knowledge transfer. Its desire to develop these mutually supportive methods 
suggests that the army had a greater awareness of the importance of organisational learning than hitherto 
thought. 
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